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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Wylie Gail Hunter appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing his
successive petition for post-conviction relief.

He asserts that he raised a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether this due process rights were violated by the State’s failure to disclose
the existence of a DVD of the traffic stop in his criminal case, and its subsequent destruction of
the DVD, and that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance
at the summary dismissal hearing.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2007, Mr. Hunter was charged with felony trafficking in marijuana. See State v.
Hunter, 2011 WL 11037668 (hereinafter, Hunter I.)1 Idaho State Police Detective Terry Morgan
began investigating Mr. Hunter for drug smuggling and testified that he had received information
that Mr. Hunter would be obtaining a rental car, driving to Canada, picking up marijuana, and
returning to Coeur d’Alene. Id. at *1. According to Detective Morgan, on the morning of
September 2, 2007, an employee of the rental car company contacted the Idaho State Police and
advised them that Mr. Hunter had rented a vehicle that morning. Id. Detective Morgan obtained
the make, model, and license plate number of the vehicle. Id.
At the suppression hearing in the criminal case, Detective Morgan testified that he
observed Mr. Hunter exceed the speed limit and commit two illegal lane changes. Id. Because
he was in an unmarked vehicle, Detective Morgan notified Trooper Ronald Sutton regarding the
alleged traffic infractions and advised him to pull the vehicle over. Id. Trooper Sutton testified
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This unpublished opinion from the Court of Appeals is contained in the clerk’s record
beginning on page 103.
1

at the suppression hearing that after obtaining Mr. Hunter’s license and registration, he went
around to the passenger’s side to collect the passenger’s identification, and while speaking with
the passenger, detected a faint odor of raw marijuana. Id. Detective Morgan arrived, and, after
Mr. Hunter was removed from the vehicle, testified that he approached the vehicle to speak to
the passenger and detected the smell of marijuana. Id.
Detective Morgan called Officer Richard Reinking in order to have a drug detention dog
at the scene. Id. at *2. He responded approximately thirty minutes after the stop. Id. The drug
dog alerted on the trunk of the vehicle and the officers located two bags with approximately
seventy-five pounds of marijuana inside. Id.
Mr. Hunter filed a motion to suppress. The district court found that there was reasonable
and articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle based upon several months of prior investigation as
well as due to the traffic violations observed by Detective Morgan. Id. The district court further
found that when Trooper Sutton smelled marijuana coming from the passenger side of the
vehicle, probable cause to search the vehicle was established. This probable cause was enhanced
by Detective Morgan smelling a somewhat stronger odor of marijuana. Id.
At a subsequent hearing on the motion to suppress, Mr. Hunter challenged the search of
his hotel room; the court found that the Mr. Hunter had failed to establish an expectation of
privacy in the room, but determined that the evidence gathered in the search of room was not
particularly relevant because the traffic violations provided an independent basis for the stop of
the vehicle. Id.
Mr. Hunter testified that prior to being stopped on the highway, he was driving on the
Sunday of Labor Day Weekend in “bumper to bumper traffic” the entire time. Id. at *4. He
testified that he was driving in the slow lane approximately five miles under the speed limit
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because he knew what was in the trunk. Id. He also testified that he did not recall having
changed lanes without signaling. Id. The district court determined that the officers were more
credible than Mr. Hunter. Id.
Mr. Hunter has always maintained that a recording of the traffic stop existed and that it
would contradict the officers’ testimony at the motion to suppress hearing. His trial counsel
made a discovery request for any videos in the State’s possession. (R., p.168.) Another trial
counsel testified in a deposition in post-conviction proceedings that he requested recordings from
the prosecutor, but none were provided. (Augmentation, p.67.)2 In fact, “we were told that there
was never a video of the stop.” (Augmentation, p.67.) Mr. Hunter even wrote to his appellate
counsel in his direct appeal, requesting that she obtain the recordings, but because they were not
in the record in district court, counsel responded that she could not add them to the appellate
record. (Augmentation, p.210.)
Mr. Hunter filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel of his prior attorneys with regard to his motion to suppress. See Hunter v. State, 2015
WL 3823828 (hereinafter, Hunter II.)3 In his petition, he made a discovery request for any audio
or video recordings of the traffic stop. Id. at *4. In affirming the district court’s denial of this
discovery request, the Court of Appeals concluded, “as noted by the district court, Hunter’s
counsel for the renewed suppression motion testified at his deposition (and the record tends to
support) that he had sought such recordings from the state and concluded that none were
available.” Id.

2

Mr. Hunter’s affidavit and supporting exhibits are not contained in the appellate record.
Mr. Hunter is filing a motion to augment with this 213-page document contemporaneously with
this Appellant’s Brief.
3
This unpublished opinion from the Court of Appeals is contained in the clerk’s record
beginning on page 103.
3

As it turns out, Trooper Sutton did create video recording of the traffic stop. (R., p.25.)
Mr. Hunter eventually discovered a document entitled “video evidence” that shows that Officer
Sutton submitted “DVD-R1-1619.” (R., p.25.) Moreover, this document shows that the disc was
destroyed on February 26, 2013, during the pendency of Mr. Hunter’s petition for postconviction relief. (R., p.25.)
Mr. Hunter then filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief, which is the subject
of this appeal. (R., p.14.) Mr. Hunter alleged that his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as his corresponding rights under the Idaho Constitution,
were violated by the State’s failure to disclose the existence of the DVD. (R., pp.16-23.)
Specifically, Mr. Hunter asserted that the State had committed a due process violation pursuant
to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In response, the State acknowledged that Mr. Hunter
“correctly complains that he did not receive a DVD of the events that occurred after the traffic
stop in this matter.” (R., p.276.) The district court found that the State had failed to disclose the
existence of the DVD. (3/2/18 Tr., p.109, L.22 – p.110, L.1.)
In his affidavit in support of this successive petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Hunter
asserted, among other things, that the DVD would show that Officer Sutton did not walk to the
passenger side of the vehicle where he claimed to have smelled the marijuana. (Augmentation,
p.4.) Mr. Hunter also pointed to testimony showing that Officer Sutton acknowledged that he
could not smell marijuana when speaking with Mr. Hunter on the driver’s side of the vehicle.
(Augmentation, p.4.) Thus, Mr. Hunter specifically challenged the basis for the probable cause
to search his vehicle in his affidavit. See Hunter I at *2.
The State moved for summary dismissal on two grounds: 1) Mr. Hunter did not show that
the DVD was destroyed in bad faith, and thus his claim failed under Arizona v. Youngblood, 488
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U.S. 51 (1988); and 2) Mr. Hunter could not meet the standard for a new trial set forth in State v.
Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685 (1976). (R., p.297.)
Following a period of sometimes contentious discovery, the district court held a hearing
on the State’s motion for summary dismissal. (See 3/2/18 Tr.) On the morning of the hearing,
counsel for Mr. Hunter filed a memorandum in response to the State’s motion for summary
dismissal in order to “incorporate new discovery that was unavailable to the Petitioner at the time
the Response to the State’s Motion was written; and Second, to address some applicable case
law.” (R., p.566.) In this memorandum, counsel submitted new arguments and information to
the court which cast doubt on the credibility of the officers in this case. The court stated that,
due to the late filing, it would not be reading the document or relying on it at the hearing.
(3/2/18 Tr., p.79, Ls.23-25.) Counsel for Mr. Hunter informed the court that the delay was her
fault, and that Mr. Hunter wished to continue the hearing and represent himself.

(3/2/18

Tr. p.103, Ls.22-25.) The court denied the request and then granted the state’s motion to dismiss
at the hearing. (3/2/18 Tr., p.104, Ls.4-8; Tr., p.111, Ls.2-9.) Mr. Hunter appealed. (R., p.616.)
He asserts that the district court erred by granting the State’s motion for summary dismissal and
abused its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance.

5

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Hunter’s successive petition for
post-conviction relief because he presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
his due process rights were violated?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Hunter’s motion for a
continuance?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hunter’s Successive Petition For PostConviction Relief Because He Presented A Genuine Issue of Material Fact As To Whether His
Due Process Rights Were Violated
A.

Introduction
Mr. Hunter submits that, by showing that the State destroyed evidence that it had

previously withheld from him in the criminal case, he raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether his due process rights were violated.

B.

The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hunter’s Successive Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief Because He Presented A Genuine Issue of Material Fact As To
Whether His Due Process Rights Were Violated
A petition for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345,

361 (2013).
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for post-conviction relief must
prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the application
for post-conviction relief is based. Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24 (2000). Unlike
the complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, an application for postconviction relief must contain more than “a short and plain statement of the
claim” that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Rather, an
application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within
the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. The application must
include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations, or must
state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id.
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007).
The district court can summarily dismiss or grant a petition for post-conviction relief if
“there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c). “In considering summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief, the trial court must accept as true verified allegations of fact in the
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application or in supporting affidavits, no matter how incredible they may appear, unless they
have been disproved by other evidence in the record.” Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901, 909
(Ct. App. 1995). The district court is “required to accept the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as
true, but need not accept the petitioner’s conclusions.” Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Any
disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party, and “all reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.” Vavold v. State, 148
Idaho 44, 45 (2009). If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must
be conducted to resolve the factual issues. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272 (Ct. App.
2002).
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file and will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party.
Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Because the evaluation of a motion for summary disposition does
not involve the finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only
determinations of law. Accordingly, an appellate court reviews a district court’s summary
dismissal order de novo. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402–03 (2006).
In this case, the State moved for summary dismissal on two grounds: 1) Mr. Hunter did
not show that the DVD was destroyed in bad faith, and thus his claim failed under Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); and 2) Mr. Hunter could not meet the standard for a new trial
set forth in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685 (1976).
The district court orally granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal. The court
held that “the issue was whether there was a nondisclosure, and I think has been established.
Then the issue also was whether that nondisclosure was a bad-faith nondisclosure, and that’s just
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not part of the record.” (3/2/18 Tr., p.109, L.22 – p.110, L.1.) The court later continued, “the
bottom line for this issue was Petitioner, Mr. Hunter, needed to put this into this record that the
nondisclosure at trial and in this post-conviction relief was an act of bad faith on the part of the
State. The petitioner has failed to provide admissible evidence that constitutes bad faith.”
(3/2/18 Tr., p.110, Ls.13-18 (emphasis added)). The court continued,
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, a 1988 U.S. Supreme Court case stands for the
proposition that good or bad faith is irrelevant when the State fails to disclose
material exculpatory evidence.
That begs the question of what is exculpatory evidence? Bad faith must be shown
if the evidence only potentially material or possibly exculpatory. Even in the light
most favorable to the [nonmoving] party here, Mr. Hunter, the Court cannot reach
any further conclusion that the contents of the DVD might have been exculpatory,
but they might not. It might have been material, but it might not.
(3/2/18 Tr., p.111, Ls.2-9.) In sum, because the court believed that Mr. Hunter needed to
establish bad faith and that the contents of the DVD must have been exculpatory, the court
granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal. The district court erred.
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes upon the government
the duty to disclose evidence in its possession which, if revealed, would deprive the defendant of
a fair trial.” State v. Avelar, 124 Idaho 317, 321 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963)). The State’s duty to disclose evidence applies to impeachment evidence as well
as exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985). Impeachment
evidence is “‘favorable to the accused,’ so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the
difference between conviction and acquittal.” Id. (internal citations omitted). For purposes of
determining whether a Brady violation has occurred, the terms “material” and “prejudicial” are
used interchangeably. See United States v. Price, 566 F.3d 900, 911 n.12 (9th Cir. 2009).
The obligation of the State to disclose favorable evidence to the defendant exists
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regardless of whether a defendant has specifically requested disclosure of the information from
the State. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995). Accordingly, constitutional error results
from the suppression of favorable evidence by the government “if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Id. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). Thus, a Brady violation is
found where: 1) evidence was favorable to the accused because it is exculpatory or impeaching;
2) the evidence was suppressed by the State either willfully or inadvertently; and 3) prejudice
ensued. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 64 (2004).
With regard to the preservation of evidence, the United States Supreme Court has held,
Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that
duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role
in the suspect’s defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality,
evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the
evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be
unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.97,
109-110 (1976). Thus, the State is required to preserve evidence whose exculpatory value was
known and is otherwise unavailable by comparable evidence.
In Youngblood, the United States Supreme Court addressed the standard to be applied
when the exculpatory value of the evidence is unknown to both the State and the defendant. In
Youngblood, the defendant was convicted of child molestation, sexual assault, and kidnapping.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 52. In the direct appeal of his conviction, he asserted that his due
process rights had been violated because the State failed to preserve semen samples from the
victim’s body and clothing. Id. He prevailed in the Arizona Court of Appeals, which held that
that timely performance of tests with properly preserved semen samples could have produced
results that might have completely exonerated the defendant and “when identity is an issue at
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trial and the police permit the destruction of evidence that could eliminate the defendant as the
perpetrator, such loss is material to the defense and is a denial of due process.” Id. at 54-55. The
United States Supreme Court disagreed. Id.
At the outset, the Court noted, “[t]here is no question but that the State complied
with Brady and Agurs here.” Id. at 55. This was because, “[t]he State disclosed relevant police
reports to respondent, which contained information about the existence of the swab and the
clothing, and the boy's examination at the hospital. The State provided respondent’s expert with
the laboratory reports and notes prepared by the police criminologist, and respondent’s expert
had access to the swab and to the clothing.” Id. Because of this, the Court determined that if the
defendant were to prevail, “it must be because of some constitutional duty over and above that
imposed by” Brady. Ultimately, when considering this heightened constitutional duty, the Court
determined that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure
to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” Id. at
58.
The fact that Youngblood did not involve a Brady claim is crucial, because, as the Court
noted in Youngblood, “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted
in Brady, makes the good or bad faith of the State irrelevant when the State fails to disclose to
the defendant material exculpatory evidence.” Id. at 57. The Court concluded that, “we think
the Due Process Clause requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the State to
preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected
to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.” Id.
In Youngblood, it was undisputed that neither party knew what the results of the testing
would have been; thus, the exculpatory value of the evidence was unknown to both parties. The
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same is not true in this case. The DVD did not need to be subjected to any testing or analysis. It
simply needed to be viewed. Trooper Sutton, who made the recording, surely knew the contents
of the recording. Thus, this is not a situation where neither party was aware of the exculpatory
value of the evidence. The State was surely aware of what the DVD contained.
Further, in Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806 (1995), this Court noted the important
distinction between Youngblood and a case where the State fails to disclose the evidence: “In
explaining that the government had not acted in bad faith in Youngblood, the Court pointed out
that none of the spoiled evidence was ‘concealed’ from the defendant. This is a clear recognition
that concealment is one method of proving that the exculpatory value of the evidence was known
to the government prior to its destruction.” Id. at 816 (citation omitted). Here, it is undisputed,
and the district court found, that the State failed to disclose the DVD. Thus, Mr. Hunter asserts
that, pursuant to Stuart, he has demonstrated that the exculpatory value of the evidence was
known to the State at the time of its destruction. Thus, the district court erred when it held that it
could not determine whether the DVD was exculpatory.
Mr. Hunter therefore asserts that he met the standard for showing a due process violation
set forth in Trombetta and Brady. Mr. Hunter was required to show that the exculpatory value of
the evidence was known and was not otherwise available by comparable evidence. Trombetta,
467 U.S. at 488-89. The exculpatory value of the evidence is shown by its concealment, and the
DVD was the only objective evidence Mr. Hunter could have used to disprove the officers’
testimony and establish that there was no probable cause to stop or search his vehicle. Pursuant
to Brady, Mr. Hunter was required to show that exculpatory evidence was withheld from him
and that prejudice ensued. Again, Mr. Hunter demonstrated that the exculpatory nature of the
evidence was known to the State by its concealment and there is no dispute that this evidence
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was withheld. The only issue remaining issue is prejudice, and Mr. Hunter submits that he was
prejudiced because he could not effectively dispute the officers’ testimony at the suppression
hearings, and, as set forth below, he was entitled to the doctrine of spoliation.
However, even if this Court concludes that Mr. Hunter was required to establish bad faith
under Youngblood, he asserts that he has met this standard. In Stuart, the Idaho Supreme Court
held that failing to provide discovery following a specific discovery request “is a sufficiently
proximate cause of the destruction of the phone log evidence so as to rise to the level of bad faith
under Youngblood.” Stuart, 127 Idaho at 816. This Court then favorably cited the Ninth Circuit
for the proposition that a “discovery request for evidence by defendant put government on notice
of the exculpatory value of the evidence such that subsequent destruction of the evidence
constituted bad faith.” Id. (citing United States v. Cooper, 983 P.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993).
And even if Mr. Hunter is required to demonstrate anything beyond nondisclosure of the
evidence in light of his specific requests, he asserts that he raised a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the evidence was destroyed in bad faith. The DVD was destroyed in contravention
of Idaho State Police policies regarding retention of evidence. The Idaho State Police records
retention schedule shows that closed case files involving felonies are to be permanently retained
“up to 5 years in district then to State Archives for permanent retention.” (R., p.533.) Because
Mr. Hunter’s case was a felony, the file should have been retained permanently.
The State relied on the affidavit of Lisa Correia in its effort to show that the DVD was
not destroyed in bad faith. (R., p.524.) According to her affidavit, because the video evidence
information sheet for the DVD was not designated as a “felony” or as a “fatality” it was not
permanently retained. (R., p.525.) This video evidence sheet was submitted with Mr. Hunter’s
petition and it does indeed state “no” under the columns for “felony” or fatality.” (R., p.25.)
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However, the same box containing “felony” or “fatality” sets for the name of the charge in this
case and it clearly states, “felony trafficking MJ.” (R., p.25.) Thus, Mr. Hunter asserts that the
State’s claim that it did not realize that it was destroying felony evidence is contradicted by the
form itself, and thus Mr. Hunter has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
DVD was destroyed in bad faith and an evidentiary hearing was necessary to determine whether
the State’s alleged mistake was a reasonable one. Further, Mr. Hunter asserted in his affidavit
that the State destroyed the DVD just as he was conducting discovery in his first post-conviction
case, in which he was asserting that his attorneys were ineffective by failing to obtain the DVD.
Finally, due to the due process violation in this case, Mr. Hunter is entitled to an
inference that the destroyed evidence would have been favorable to his petition. In Stuart, this
Court agreed that “application of a favorable inference under the spoliation doctrine is the
appropriate remedy for a Youngblood due process violation.” Id. “The spoliation doctrine is a
general principle of civil litigation which provides that upon a showing of intentional destruction
of evidence by an opposing party, an inference arises that the missing evidence was adverse to
the party’s position.” Id. Thus, with this inference, Mr. Hunter submits that he has raised a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was prejudiced.
In addition to a favorable presumption, Mr. Hunter has submitted affidavits in which he
asserts what the video would show. He asserted that the video would show that Trooper Sutton
never approached the passenger’s side of the vehicle, which is where the district court in the
criminal case found that probable cause developed. (Augmentation, p.4.) He also attached an
affidavit that he prepared for a federal case where he again asserted that Trooper Sutton never
walked to the passenger’s side of the vehicle. (Augmentation, p.203.) He asserted that the video
would show how heavy the traffic was. (Augmentation, p.202.) He also asserted that the video
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would show that, due to the fact that it took Detective Morgan four to six minutes to arrive at the
scene, Detective Morgan was never following his vehicle and could not have observed traffic
violations. (Augmentation, p.204.) He also asserted that Detective Morgan was driving a
different vehicle than what he testified to at the suppression hearing. (Augmentation, p.205.) He
also asserted that Detective Morgan only approached the driver’s side of the vehicle.
(Augmentation, p.207.) The State never addressed Mr. Hunter’s factual assertions in this case.
In sum, Mr. Hunter submitted affidavits that raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Trooper Sutton ever approached the passenger’s side of the vehicle, which is where he
testified that he smelled marijuana. He also submitted that the video would contradict the
officers in several ways. Thus, he raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the video
was exculpatory and whether he was prejudiced by the State’s withholding and ultimately
destroying the DVD.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Hunter’s Motion For A Continuance

A.

Introduction
Mr. Hunter submits that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for

a continuance after counsel acknowledged that she did not timely file her response to the State’s
motion for summary dismissal.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Hunter’s Motion For A
Continuance
On the morning of the scheduled hearing on the State’s motion for summary dismissal,

counsel for Mr. Hunter filed a memorandum in opposition. (R., p.566.) In addition to the claims
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raised in the initial petition, counsel for Mr. Hunter asserted that the State did not disclose the
rental car agreement, and this agreement would show that the car was returned to Avis several
days after he was stopped, which would contradict the officers’ testimony that the car was
released at the scene to an Avis employee. (R., pp.569-70.) Further, counsel submitted that the
impound report for Mr. Hunter’s codefendant indicated that property was returned to him, and “it
does not make sense that anyone other than the personnel at the ISP would save, document, and
return” items to the co-defendant, which was further evidence that the vehicle was not
immediately returned to Avis. (R., p.570.) Counsel further asserted that the State had failed to
provide drug ledgers seized from the vehicle and at the hotel or photographs during the criminal
case. (R., p.570.) Counsel also asserted that the Avis employee who testified at the suppression
hearing was not the person who rented him the vehicle, and that Mr. Hunter had information
indicating that she was a confidential informant. (R., p.571.) Further, counsel submitted a report
from Detective Morgan which indicated that he spoke with this witness several months after the
incident and she indicated that the car smelled so heavily of marijuana that it was taken to
Spokane for cleaning, but Trooper Sutton indicated that he could not smell the marijuana while
speaking to Mr. Hunter on the driver’s side of the vehicle. (R., p.571.) Counsel also asserted
that Mr. Hunter had a witness that would testify that any ventilation from the trunk to the
passenger compartment “is ludicrous.” (R., p.572.) Counsel also asserted that Mr. Hunter’s
counsel in a federal case and his federal probation officers were both provided with reports from
Trooper Sutton’s file in August of 2017, which controverted the State’s assertion that all of the
case files had been destroyed. (R., p.572.)
At the hearing, the district court stated that it had received Mr. Hunter’s memorandum
and supporting documents, but “the Court has not read that and will not be reading that “It’s
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simply an untimely response, and the I’m just simply not going to read it.” (3/2/18 Tr., p.79,
Ls.23-25.) Counsel for Mr. Hunter responded,
I had intended that [filing] to be a reduction of just my talking, and anticipated
that the Court would read it after. I had anticipated submitting it quite some time
ago. I had several issues with my internet and my computer, which are my issues,
not anyone else’s and I don’t state them today as an excuse.
I certainly didn’t expect the Court to have read it, and I certainly wouldn’t have
any objection if the Court wants to – if it’s going to consider it, it wants to allow
[the State] time to respond. The main reason I did it is because I wasn’t sure how
much argument there would be, and there’s a couple pieces of new information
that hadn’t been able to be filed before because we didn’t have them.
(3/2/18 Tr., p.80, Ls.7-21.) Counsel later requested that she be permitted to have Mr. Hunter
testify in order to make sure that the documents she wanted the court to consider were in
evidence. (3/2/18 Tr., p.97, Ls.20-23.) The court denied the motion because the case was set for
a summary dismissal hearing, not an evidentiary hearing and the time for placing evidence of
genuine issues of material fact was “well before the day of the hearing.” (3/2/18, Ls.1-10.)
Following more argument, counsel then stated, “Your Honor, my client may wish to
make a request to the Court to proceed pro se. He believes that my failure to get some of the
items I attached to my memo in [evidence] is ineffective. I do believe that at some point he
should have a right to address the Court and the Court will need to decide if the Court wants him
to proceed with or without me.” (3/2/18 Tr., p.103, L.22 – p.104, L.3.) The court interpreted
this as a request to “suspend the matter and allow Mr. Hunter to represent himself,” which the
court found to be an untimely request. (3/2/18 Tr., pp.4-8.) The court concluded, “arguments
have been made to the Court and the record is before the Court. And so certainly after this
proceeding, whatever the outcome may be, Mr. Hunter obviously has the right to be a selfrepresented litigant ….” (3/2/18 Tr., p.104, Ls.10-14.) The court subsequently orally granted
the State’s motion for summary dismissal without regarding counsel’s filing.
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The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance rests within the discretion of the
trial court. State v. Carman, 114 Idaho 791, 793 (1988). When an exercise of discretion is
reviewed on appeal, the inquiry involves: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue
as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion
and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power
Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991) (quoting State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)). This
“discretion is not unfettered, and [the district court’s] proper role relative to evaluating [a]
motion for a continuance necessitate[s] weighing the competing interests of the State and the
defendant.” State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 707 (1993).
In this case, the court’s primary concern in denying the motion to continue the
proceeding so that Mr. Hunter would represent himself or get his additional information before
the court was that the case had been going on for years. (3/2/18 Tr., p.106, Ls.15-18.) While the
court’s concern for a timely resolution of the case is understandable, it is important to remember
that the entire reason for the instant case is that the State had possession of a DVD for nearly five
years and then destroyed it, despite Mr. Hunter repeatedly requesting it. The State’s failure to
provide the DVD initially upon Mr. Hunter’s request is the reason for this litigation in the first
place. Further, Mr. Hunter’s interest in getting a continuance was very high once counsel
essentially admitted that she had provided deficient performance. Counsel indicated she had
intended to file her response earlier, but apparently due to computer issues, which she admitted
were hers alone, did not file until the morning of the hearing. Thus, this was counsel’s failure,
not Mr. Hunter’s.

And because Mr. Hunter cannot claim ineffective assistance of post-

conviction counsel in another successive petition, see Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389 (2014), the
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instant petition is the only opportunity Mr. Hunter will have to litigate this issue. Thus, his
interest in obtaining a continuance to present his evidence was high.
In sum, on the morning of the hearing counsel submitted information that Mr. Hunter
believed would impact the State’s credibility. This delay was due to counsel’s actions, not
Mr. Hunter’s. Because of counsel’s delay, the district court did not consider this information.
Considering Mr. Hunter’s interest in presenting his evidence and claims to the court in this
successive petition, Mr. Hunter respectfully submits that the district court did not reach its
conclusion through an exercise of reason and he requests that, if this Court finds that he did not
raise a genuine issue of material fact by showing the State’s withholding and subsequent
destroying of evidence, that this case be remanded so that Mr. Hunter has the opportunity to
present all of his evidence to the court.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hunter requests that the district court’s order summarily dismissing his petition be
reversed and his case remanded for further proceedings. Alternatively, he requests that the
denial of his motion for a continuance be reversed and his case remanded for further
proceedings.
DATED this 27th day of February, 2019.

/s/ Justin M. Curtis
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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